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REFERENCES TO DRAFT CABLE HAND-CARRIED TO STATE
TO BE CABLED VIA STATE TO BEIJING EMBASSY

Chinese Views of Stalin
3 Nov 81

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DRAFT

3 November 1981

REF: BEIJING 11917 FBIS HK260744 BEIJING 11176 BEIJING 11753

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/10 : CIA-RDP09-00997R000100240004-9

cc: *LRB*

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHFD/USINFO WASHDC
^INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6736
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 3024
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 3535
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EZ1:
C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIJING 11917
EZ2:
PLEASE PASS TO FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PINT, CH
SUBJ: CRITICISM OF STALIN THE CHINESE MEDIA
REF: FBIS HK 260744 26 OCTOBER 1981

EMBASSY IS INTERESTED IN CRITICAL REFERENCES TO STALIN
IN THE CHINESE MEDIA. WE NOTE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT REF
MESSAGE MENTIONS MAO HAVING CRITICIZED STALIN FOR
MAGNIFYING CLASS STRUGGLE. COULD YOU PROVIDE US WITH SOME
BACKGROUND ON TREATMENT OF STALIN IN THE CHINESE MEDIA
AND A JUDGEMENT AS TO WHETHER, FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE,
SOMETHING IS BREWING, IN THIS AREA.

FREEMAN

NNNN

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I. 27 Oct 81

P R C R E G I O N A L A F F A I R S
NORTH REGION

R 1

CHEN WEIDA BAN YUE TAN ARTICLE ON RESOLUTION

HK260744 Tianjin RIBAO in Chinese 24 Sep 81 p 1

[Article by Chen Weida [7115 0251 6671]: "Study the Marxist Theory of Knowledge Through the Resolution"]

[Text] An article entitled "Study the Marxist Theory of Knowledge Through the Resolution," written by Chen Weida, first secretary of the Tianjin Municipal CCP Committee, will be published in the No 18 issue of the BAN YUE TAN magazine to come out tomorrow. The following is the full text of the article.

We can often find party members and cadres who lack vigor in their work, who dare not criticize or wage struggles against other people's erroneous words or actions, and who do not enthusiastically implement the party's line, principles and policies. When we ask them why, they will say that our party has committed many mistakes so that as members of the Communist Party, they lack assurance in trying to influence others. An important cause of this thinking among these comrades is that they are not good at applying the Marxist theory of knowledge in viewing mistakes and setbacks. Therefore, in studying the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC, we must not only clearly understand matters of right and wrong concerning major historical events, but what is more important, we must study the Marxist stand, viewpoints and methods the resolution embodies in its analysis of historical events, so that we can help some comrades free themselves from the fetters of idealism and metaphysics and consequently their confidence in our party can be basically restored.

What is the meaning of a mistake? One commits a mistake when one does not correctly understand objective laws and work according to them. It is not easy to correctly understand objective laws. In particular, it is an unprecedented undertaking in human history to practice socialism in a poor and backward country with a large population such as ours, and therefore it is difficult for any political party or individual to absolutely and accurately comply with objective laws in all historical periods and in formulating all major policies. Very often, the correct understanding and mastering of objective laws cannot be achieved in only one or two rounds of practice. Consider the question of shifting the emphasis of our work. More than once, we experienced setbacks in attempting to bring about this shift. The first time we proposed it, it was not put into practice. The second time we did so, people's attitudes toward it wavered and it was rejected. When this question was raised at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, it was already the third time. Thus, to acquire knowledge about this question is not easy and involves a high price. The same is true of the question of class struggle. Comrade Mao Zedong criticized Stalin for magnifying class struggle. He also said that there are two categories of contradictions in the socialist society, the majority of which being contradictions among the people, and that large-scale and turbulent class struggles have basically ended. However, shortly afterward, disruptions broke out in Poland and Hungary, a small number of rightists attacked our party, and Khrushchev applied pressure on us. Consequently, within our party, people could not arrive at a unified view on class struggle. In this complicated situation, Comrade Mao Zedong put forth the ideas that class struggle must be stressed all the time, every day, every month and every year; that grasping class struggle was an effective solution to all problems, that class struggle must be taken as the key link, and so on. Consequently, class struggle was magnified and the contradictions among ourselves were confused with those between ourselves and the enemy. It is precisely by virtue of our past practice and the lessons of our bitter experiences that we can now correctly understand and resolve this question. In a certain sense, correct leadership often emerges out of mistakes (direct or indirect ones).

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R 2

PRC REGIONAL AFFAIRS
NORTH REGION

Our party committed the mistake of launching the "Great Cultural Revolution," one which affected our country on an overall scale, but our party also learned an extremely profound lesson from this historical event. We have acquired knowledge from the bitter defeat and have gradually come to discover the relevant laws. Now, we have attained an unprecedentedly high level of understanding about socialist revolution and construction. Our party has vigorously and correctly summed up the experience of the mistakes it committed. This shows that our party is open and above board and has a high sense of responsibility toward the people; that instead of being no longer great, glorious and correct, it is even more so than before; and that instead of being incapable of exercising leadership, it has even greater leadership ability. This has been proved by past history and current practice.

A review of our party's history reveals that our party committed many mistakes during the democratic revolution period. The two gravest mistakes were Chen Duxiu's rightist capitulationism and Wang Ming's leftist opportunism. The latter caused the Red Army to dwindle from a force of 300,000 persons to around 30,000 persons and caused the party's forces in the White area to be almost completely destroyed. Did our party become useless because it committed those mistakes? History has proved that this was not so. Our party continued to mature precisely amid mistakes and setbacks. After the Zunyi meeting, the rectification movement of 1942 and the adoption of the Resolution on Certain Historical Questions in 1945, the level of ideology was raised and the understanding of party members was unified, so that finally our party could lead the Chinese people to achieve victory in the democratic revolution.

The same reasoning also applies to the current situation. Since the third plenary session of the Central Committee, our party has achieved tremendous successes in various aspects. This shows that our party has really become more mature. For example, since the third plenary session, there have been some controversies about our party's rural policies as well as some resistance to implementing these policies. However, on the whole, these policies have been implemented rather smoothly and within a short span of 2 years of more, we have achieved great success which is acknowledged globally. It can be imagined that if such policies were proposed before the "Great Cultural Revolution," the controversies would have been much more acute and the resistance much stronger. The reason is that the "Great Cultural Revolution" caused enormous disruption to agricultural production, so that people have gotten a deep impression of the harmful effects of leftist mistakes. Therefore, from the viewpoint of historical development and the Marxist theory of knowledge, although we paid an agonizingly high price in the "Great Cultural Revolution," today's progress in people's understanding and development in national agricultural production constitute a kind of compensation for that price.

Chairman Mao said that under certain conditions, material things can become a spiritual force or the other way around. Our 32 years of practice is a kind of material thing which gives rise to a spiritual force when the practice is raised to the level of theory in writing the resolution. It can be believed that the resolution will certainly become a huge material force which will promote the vigorous development of our cause. In studying the resolution, we must adopt the dialectical-materialist stand, viewpoint and method, sum up the lessons of our own experiences of success and failure, continuously raise our own level of understanding, closely integrate the gist of the CCP Central Committee's directives with the actual situation in Tianjin, and more resolutely and consciously implement the line, principles and policies formulated by our party since the third plenary session. We must eliminate all sentiments and thoughts of pessimism, dejection and unwillingness to advance. We must rouse ourselves, temper our own revolutionary will and devote all our strength to building our country into a modern socialist power.

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ACTION: NONE INFO: CAD/A, CMASS-E (), EAP/CH-4, EAP/CPSC,
 EAP/SRA, NIO/CN, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPN-U, DER/C/U1R, DER/CEC, DER/CHD,
 DER/CTD, DER/IWE, DER/UAS, DER/UED, DER/USE, OGSR/ER-2, OGSR/GD/S,
 OPA/AMERS, RO/EC, USSR/E, USSR/F, USSR/M, USSR/SRA, FILE, RF, OPA/11,
 PPB/LCEU, AB, CI-3, CI/FL, CR/FE, CRES/ARO, D/FBIS-2, DCD-3, EA-6,
 EPS/EG-2, FR, IAD/CAS-3, IAD/IC, IAD/SOG-4, NFAC/CH, NICAG/CH, NICAG/PM,
 NIO/CH, NIO/PE, NIO/USSR, DER-3, OGSR/SSRD-2, DIA/ERRS, OSR/EF, OSR/SE,
 SE-3, SSD/SSB, STD/CSTB, (52/W)

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 DE RUMJPG #1176/01 2830250
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 O R 100203Z OCT 81
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6225
 INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 443
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 977
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1207
 RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 079
 RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 110
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1370
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 302
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
 RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC
 RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 11176 COMBINED SECTION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/9/87 (TAYLOR, JOHN J.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, UR, CH, SHUM, EGEN, SOCI, PINR, MILI
 SUBJ: (C) MAJOR CHINESE INTERNAL DOCUMENT CASTIGATES
 STALIN AND SOVIET INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL
 POLICIES

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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2. SUMMARY: THE EMBASSY HAS OBTAINED AN INTERNAL CHINESE DOCUMENT ON THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES WHICH COULD HAVE MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE CHINA AS WELL AS FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE DOCUMENT DECLARES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT A SOCIALIST COUNTRY BECAUSE IT PURSUES "SOCIAL IMPERIALISM" ABROAD AND BECAUSE ITS POWER STRUCTURE AT HOME LACKS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY." THE DOCUMENT PRESENTS DETAILED CHARGES THAT STALIN CREATED A BUREAUCRATIC POWER STRUCTURE OF "GREAT EVIL" IN THE THIRTIES AND FORTIES WHICH FEATURED OVER-EMPHASIS ON HEAVY MILITARY INDUSTRY AND EXCESSIVE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER IN THE HANDS OF A FEW. THIS SYSTEM WAS PERPETUATED AND STRENGTHENED BY KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV. THE DOCUMENT STATES, AND HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY RELIANT ON FOREIGN EXPANSIONISM TO COMPENSATE FOR SEVERE INTERNAL ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS. UNDER STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV, THE DOCUMENT ASSERTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS LEFT THE SOCIALIST ROAD IN POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY AREAS. THE DOCUMENT HOLDS THAT SOVIET HEGEMONY IS BASED ON A HISTORICAL TRADITION OF EXPANSIONISM UNDER THE RUSSIAN CZAR COMBINED WITH THE NEED FOR THE INTERNAL SOVIET BUREAUCRATIC POWER STRUCTURE TO PERPETUATE ITSELF BY EXPANDING ABROAD.

*a la
Ye's formula -
Sep. 1979
"repressive &
hegemonist"*

3. THE ARTICLE REJECTS THE CENTRALIZED, AUTHORITARIAN POWER STRUCTURE BUILT BY STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV IN THE SOVIET UNION AND PROVIDES A PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALE FOR CHINA'S FUTURE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. IT SUGGESTS THAT THE PRAGMATISTS IN POWER TODAY IN CHINA FAVOR THOSE THEORETICIANS WHO HAVE SUPPORTED A MORE LIBERAL MARXIST APPROACH TO DISTRIBUTING POWER IN A SOCIALIST SOCIETY, STRUCTURING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND ORDERING PRIORITIES IN ECONOMIC GOALS. THE EMBASSY IS PREPARING A CHINA ESSAY WHICH WILL DEAL MORE COMPREHENSIVELY WITH THIS ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

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4. THE EMBASSY HAS OBTAINED AN INTERNAL DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET HEGEMONISM." THE DOCUMENT IS BASED ON A LECTURE GIVEN TO GRADUATE STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS IN THE

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BEIJING UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT BY THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT. LIU KEMING. THE LECTURE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PRINTED AND AND DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE UNIVERSITY'S GRADUATE SCHOOL ECONOMIC STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS. IT HAS NOT BEEN PUBLISHED OR REPORTED IN THE PRESS. THE AUTHOR IS CURRENTLY THE DIRECTOR OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCE'S INSTITUTE FOR SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN STUDIES. HIS FORMER PARTY AND CURRENT "ACADEMIC" POSITIONS MAKE THE DOCUMENT AN AUTHORITATIVE VIEW OF SOVIET INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES.

5. THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF THE DOCUMENT IS ITS APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AS AN UNREALENTING IMPERIALISTIC POWER DRIVEN BY INTERNAL ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS AND A TYRANNICAL POWER STRUCTURE. STALIN, IT CLAIMS, "DESTROYED THE ROOTS OF SOCIALISM" IN THE USSR. KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV FOLLOWED UP STALIN'S FOREIGN POLICY OF "GREAT POWER CHAUVINISM," WITH A FOREIGN POLICY OF HEGEMONISM. THE SOVIET UNION, THE DOCUMENT CHARGES "HAS BECOME AN IMPERIALIST COUNTRY WITH STATE MONOPOLIES. THIS IS SOCIAL IMPERIALISM."

6. THE TERM "SOCIAL IMPERIALISM" WAS AN IMPORTANT PART OF BEIJING'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BEFORE THE DEATH OF MAO, A PERIOD WHEN SINO-SOVIET POLEMICAL EXCHANGES WERE SUSTAINED AND SHRILL. LIKE THE RECENT RE-APPRAISAL OF MAO'S CONTRIBUTIONS, THE TREATMENT OF THIS SUBJECT REFLECTS BEIJING'S NEW WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH DIFFICULT IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES. THE REASSERTION OF THE LABEL "SOCIAL IMPERIALISM" AND THE ATTENDANT CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET INTERNAL POLICIES AS NON-SOCIALIST RE-AFFIRMS THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION AS ONE ASPECT OF THE RANGE OF POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, TERRITORIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA. NOTABLY, THE DOCUMENT REJECTS THE TERM "REVISIONIST" WHICH THE CHINESE USED IN THE 60'S TO CHARACTERIZE THE ALLEGED RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM IN THE USSR.

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good
"revisionist" USSR system as
"state monopoly
capitalism"
how do they now
make the
distinction?

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7. THE LENGTHY TREATMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DEPARTURE FROM THE SOCIALIST PATH IN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES AND ITS DENUNCIATION OF SOVIET LEADERS INCLUDING STALIN HAVE NOT YET SURFACED IN THE CHINESE PUBLIC MEDIA. THEIR APPEARANCE IN THIS FORM, HOWEVER, INDICATES THAT THE PARTY LINE MAY NOW BE ESTABLISHED. THEY COINCIDE WITH THE VIEWS WE HAVE HEARD IN PRIVATE FROM CHINESE ACADEMICS AND MARXIST THEORISTS, INCLUDING LI SHENGZHI, DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE AND A LEADING MEMBER OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST INSTITUTE. SEEPAGE INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR A MORE FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THEIR THESIS MAY NOT BE FAR AWAY.

8. IT IS NOTEWORTHY IN THIS REGARD THAT MOSCOW HAS LONG DENOUNCED CHINA'S OWN INTERNAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. THE SOVIET MEDIA, HOWEVER, HAVE YET TO DEPICT CHINA AS A NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH SOVIET THEORETICAL JOURNALS ARE WARNING THAT THE APPEARANCE OF CAPITALIST INFLUENCES IN CHINA COULD "GET OUT OF HAND" IF ALLOWED TO DEVELOP FURTHER. ?

9. ANOTHER NOTEWORTHY FEATURE OF THE DOCUMENT IS THE UNDERCURRENT OF FEAR REGARDING SOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS TOWARD CHINA. THE DOCUMENT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT CHINESE FEARS HAVE BEEN KEPT ALIVE BY THE CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY BUILD UP ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN MONGOLIA AND SIBERIA, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THE SOVIET USE OF VIETNAM AND POTENTIALLY INDIA TO ENCIRCLE CHINA. THE DOCUMENT CHARACTERIZES THE SOVIET AGGRESSIVE THRUST IN THE WORLD AS NOT LINKED TO ANY INDIVIDUAL LEADER, OR TO MISTAKES MADE OVER A PARTICULAR PERIOD OF TIME BUT RATHER AS A LONG TERM STRATEGIC DESIGN MOVING INEXORABLY FORWARD. LIU'S ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET EMPHASIS ON SIBERIA DURING THE BREZHNEV ERA AS "OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE IN FACING CHINA" REVEALS BEIJING'S SENSITIVITY TO THE LONG TERM STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT THAT RARELY APPEARS IN CHINESE PUBLIC OR EVEN PRIVATE COMMENT.

*which Sov. succession
can't change*

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10. THE DOCUMENT PRESENTS A DRAMATIC ESCALATION OF THE CHINESE CRITICISM OF STALIN. IT NOTES STALIN'S "GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS" BETWEEN 1928 AND 1940 IN INDUSTRIALIZING THE SOVIET UNION AND LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II, BUT IT ATTACKS STALIN FOR DESTROYING THE PARTY AND SOVIET "LEGAL SYSTEM," AND INSTITUTING ONE-MAN RULE. MORE SIGNIFICANT TO THE MAIN THESEIS, IT CHARGES STALIN WITH CREATING A BUREAUCRATIC POWER STRUCTURE OF "GREAT EVIL" THAT HAS BEEN PERPETUATED AND STRENGTHENED BY HIS HEIRS, WHO HAVE UTILIZED IT FOR EXPLOITATION OF WORKERS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR EXPANSION ABROAD. IN A REMARKABLE ASIDE, LIU NOTES THAT THE WORKERS OF POLAND HAVE RISEN UP AGAINST SIMILAR EXPLOITATION BY THE POLISH BUREAUCRATIC POWER STRUCTURE.

11. ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESSED, THERE IS AN UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR ANALOGY BETWEEN MAO'S STYLE OF LEADERSHIP DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND STALIN'S MISTAKES IN INTERNAL POLICY. THE DOCUMENT CLAIMS THAT SOVIET SUCCESSORS TO STALIN HAD THE SAME OPTIONS AS DID MAO'S SUCCESSORS: RETURNING TO GENUINE SOCIALISM OR CONTINUING ON THE PATH TOWARD NON-SOCIALISM. KHRUSHCHEV AND [MAO] LIU CHARGES, TOOK THE LATER COURSE

12. THE DOCUMENT CONCLUDES BY ADVOCATING THAT CHINA "THROW OFF THE FETTERS" OF THE SOVIET MODEL, PROCEED ACCORDING TO CHINA'S REAL SITUATION" AND CONSTRUCT A "CHINESE STYLE SOCIALIST ROAD." IT CALLS FOR A RESOLUTE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE USSR, "THIS HEGEMONISTIC, IMPERIALISTIC COUNTRY WEARING SOCIALIST CLOTHES," AND DECLARES THAT SOVIET POLICIES MAKE AN IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IMPOSSIBLE.

13. LIU'S THESIS PROVIDES A PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONAL FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF CHINA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. ITS PROMULGATION, ALTHOUGH STILL TO A RESTRICTED AUDIENCE, SUGGESTS THAT THE PRAGMATISTS IN POWER TODAY FAVOR THOSE THEORETICIANS WHO HAVE ARGUED FOR MORE LIBERAL MARXIST APPROACH TO

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previously, focus
under Mao thru Ye
in '79, was on
oppression of
minorities

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DISTRIBUTING POWER IN A SOCIALIST SOCIETY; STRUCTURING
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS; AND ORDERING
PRIORITIES IN ECONOMIC GOALS.

14. EMBASSY IS DUCHING TO THE DEPARTMENT AN AIRGRAM
WITH MORE DETAILS OF LIU'S ARTICLE AND ENCLOSING A COPY
OF THE CHINESE TEXT.
HUMMEL

END OF MESSAGE

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STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: CAD/A; CMASSE-E (); EAP/CH-4; EAP/CPSC;
 EAP/SRA; NIO/CN; ODPH-H; ODPN-N; UDUU-U; OER/CEC; OER/CHD; OER/CTD;
 OER/IWE; OGSR/EF-2; OGSR/GD/S; OPA/AMERS; OSA/CS/CA; OSA/EA/G; OSA/PA;
 OSA/PA/D; OSA/PA/F; OSA/PA/S; USA/SE; OSA/SE/I; OSA/SE/R;
 PLANFAC-E (); RO/EC; FILE; RF; OPA/II; PPB/LCEU; C1-3; C1/FL; CR/FE;
 CRES/ARO; D/FRIS-2; D/OMS-3; DCD-3; EA-6; EPS/EG-2; FR; IAD/CAS-3;
 IAD/IC; ICS/HTO; NICAG/CH; NICAG/PM; NIO/CH; NIO/PE; NIO/USSR; OER-3;
 DIA/ERRS; ORD; OSR/EF; OSR/MEDA; OSR/MEDT; OSR/MEE; OTS; SE-3; SSD/SSB;
 STD/CSTB; STD/LSB; (53/W)

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TUR: 240426Z OCT 81

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 R 220715Z OCT 81
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6025
 INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 050
 RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 086
 RUDKAR/BUCHAREST 171
 RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 056
 RUFHDL/AMEMBASSY BONN 463
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 994
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 033
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 323
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1229
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 RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 115
 RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON 016
 RUEHDI/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1381
 RUEHIA/USICA 012
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
 ZEN/ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE PA (POUCH)
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 11753 COMBINED SECTION

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 10/23/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) DR-M
 TAGS: PEPF, PPOF, SHUM; UP; CH; EGEN. SCUL; PINS; SOCI
 SUBJ: (C) CHINA ESSAY NO. 25 CHINA ABANDONS THE

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TOR: 240426Z OCT 81

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SOVIET MODEL, MOVES TOWARD ITS OWN BRAND OF
"SINO-COMMUNISM"

REF: BEIJING 11176 (NOTAL)

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: THE CHINESE APPEAR TO BE PUTTING TOGETHER AN IDEOLOGICAL BOMB, ALTHOUGH THEY DISCLAIM ANY INTENTION OF "LOBBING IT INTO THE MEN'S ROOM AT THE KREMLIN" IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. JUDGING BY THE AS YET UNPUBLISHED SPEECH (REPORTED REFTEL) BY LIU KEMING, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOVIET AFFAIRS, THE ATTACK ON SOVIET SOCIETY FROM STALIN TO THE PRESENT IS NOT SIMPLY A NEUTRON DEVICE VAPORIZING INDIVIDUALS AND LEAVING MARXIST-LENINIST STRUCTURES UNDAMAGED. INSTEAD, THE TREATISE BLASTS AWAY AT STALIN-CONSTRUCTED BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR AND OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LIU'S ANALYSIS FOR CHINA'S OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES ARE OBVIOUS AND POTENTIALLY FAR REACHING. CHINESE MARXIST THEORETICIANS PRIVATELY CONFIRM STALIN'S IDEOLOGICAL DEMISE HERE. THEY REJECT THE SOVIET MODEL CONSTRUCTED OVER THE PAST SIXTY YEARS AND FAVOR INSTEAD A "CHINESE STYLE SOCIALIST ROAD." THEY STATE THAT THE CHINESE ARE STUDYING YUGOSLAV AND HUNGARIAN EXPERIMENTS AS POSSIBLY APPLICABLE TO CHINA. ONE LEADING THEORETICIAN JOKED THAT CHINA'S OWN DEVELOPING ROAD COULD BE CALLED "DENGISM" WITH PRAGMATISM AS THE GUIDING LIGHT. THE ULTIMATE CONFIGURATION OF "SINO-COMMUNISM" APPEARS STILL IN DOUBT, EVEN IN THE MINDS OF ITS LEADING ADVOCATES. IT IS NEVERTHELESS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE CHINESE ORDERING OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES TO EMPHASIZE LIGHT INDUSTRY, CONSUMER GOODS AND LIVING STANDARDS AS WELL AS RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND THE OPENING OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS TO NON-COMMUNIST (BUT NOT ANTI-COMMUNIST) ELEMENTS ALL DEPART RADICALLY FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE TOTALITARIAN CONTROLS WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE SOVIET MODEL.

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END SUMMARY.

3. FOR THIRTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE DEATH OF MAO, BEIJING REGULARLY CASTIGATED THE USSR AS A "REVISIONIST STATE!" BUT WITH THEIR OWN POST-MAO REFORMS STRESSING INCENTIVES AND PROFIT-AND-LOSS ACCOUNTABILITY, THE CHINESE DROPPED THE SUBJECT. STILL THE QUESTION NAGGED: COULD THE SOVIET UNION AS A "SOCIAL-IMPERIALIST" POWER IRRETRIEVABLY BENT ON WORLD HEGEMONY, STILL BE A "SOCIALIST" COUNTRY?

4. IN 1979, A GROUP OF CHINESE SCHOLARS IN HEILONGJIANG PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE IN A LOCAL JOURNAL THAT CONCLUDED THAT SINCE PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION STILL EXISTED IN THE SOVIET UNION, IT REMAINED A SOCIALIST COUNTRY DESPITE ITS EXPANSIONIST POLICY. BEIJING QUICKLY REBUKED THESE ACADEMICS, AND DENG XIAOPING AND OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS IN PRIVATE INTERVIEWS ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT A SOCIALIST COUNTRY. LIU KEMING SPECIFICALLY ASSERTS THAT STATE OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION ALONE IS AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION IS SOCIALIST.

5. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC CHINESE TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE, BUT IN THE COLD HALLS OF BEIJING'S MARXIST-LENINIST INSTITUTE, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, LIBERAL MARXIST THINKERS CONTINUED TO CONTEMPLATE

THE QUESTIONS OF JUST HOW THE SOVIET UNION WENT ASTRAY.

ONE OF THESE THEORISTS, LI SHENGZHI, A LEADING MEMBER OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST INSTITUTE AND NOW HEAD OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE, IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION SOME TIME AGO PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET SOCIETY THAT ANTICIPATED MUCH OF THE ANALYSIS IN LIU'S TALK. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, LIU KEMING ALSO EXPLAINED TO US HIS VIEW AS TO WHY THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT A SOCIALIST COUNTRY. HIS ADDRESS ON THE SUBJECT TO A UNIVERSITY AUDIENCE AND THE PRINTING OF THE TEXT IN AN INTERNAL DOCUMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE VIEW HAS A CERTAIN SANCTION, PRESUMABLY INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, HU QIAOMU, REPUTEDLY THE MOST INFLUENTIAL

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THEORIST IN THE DENG GROUP.

6. THE THEORY, AS EXPLAINED BY LIU, IS STRIKING FOR ITS SHARP ATTACK ON STALIN, WHOM THE CHINESE HAD PREVIOUSLY DEFENDED AS HAVING ACCOMPLISHED -- A LA MAU -- MORE GOOD THAN HARM. LIU ACCUSES STALIN OF HAVING CREATED "A GREAT EVIL" IN THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE, OF THEREBY DESTROYING THE PARTY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF BURYING THE ROOTS OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM, AND OF SUPPRESSING DISSIDENT.

7. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, LIU STATES THAT WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT SIMPLY A CASE OF THE EXCESSES OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS. MOSCOW'S ERRONEOUS INTERNATL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES, HE ASSERTS, SPANG FROM THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE THAT WAS FOSTERED IN THE SOVIET UNION UNDER STALIN. AS LIU AND HIS COLLEAGUES SEE IT, THE EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE USSR AND THE DESTRUCTION OF "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY" LED TO THE CREATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POWER STRUCTURE. (OTHER CHINESE THEORISTS HAVE OCCASIONALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET BETRAYAL OF SOCIALIST IDEALS BEGAN AS EARLY AS LENIN'S TIME.) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS RULE AND SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, THE POWER STRUCTURE STRESSED HEAVY INDUSTRY AND MILITARY POWER, WHICH GAVE RISE TO AN UNBALANCED ECONOMY AND INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS. THIS IN TURN REQUIRED EXTERNAL EXPANSION AS A SOLUTION.

8. LIU CONCEDES THAT IT WAS LOGICAL FOR STALIN IN THE 20'S AND 30'S TO EMPHSIZE HEAVY INDUSTRY AND MILITARY ARMAMENT BECAUSE OF THE "IMPERIALIST ENCIRCLEMENT" AND THE "FASCIST THEREAT" AT THE TIME. NEVERTHELESS, THE CONCENTRATION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES ON THE MILITARY WAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS, AND BUILT UP ITS OWN MOMENTUM. THIS EVOLVED INTO "GREAT NATION CHAUVINISM" UNDER STALIN AND HEGEMONIC EXPANSION" UNDER KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV. FOLLOWING MARXIST GUIDELINES, LIU MAKES THE POINT THAT SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICIES REFLECT INTERNAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES REFLECT INTERNAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES. THE BUREAUCRATIC DICTATORSHIP, HE CONTENDS, REQUIRES CONTINUING MILITARY BUILD UP AND

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EXPANSION ABROAD TO JUSTIFY AND RETAIN ITS POWER AT HOME.

9. IF AND WHEN LIU'S THESIS IS MADE PUBLIC IT WILL NOT HELP SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS; INDEED SCREAMS AND SHOUTS FROM THE KREMLIN MAY BE HEARD AROUND THE WORLD. BUT WHAT STRIKES US AS MOST INTERESTING ABOUT LIU'S PAPER IS THAT LESSONS THAT IT DRAWS FOR CHINA'S OWN FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. AS LIU SUGGESTS, THE BASIC QUESTION IS HOW TO REFORM A MARXIST-LENINIST SYSTEM SO AS TO AVOID THE CONCENTRATION AND ABUSE OF POWER. LIU PROCLAIMS THAT CHINA HAS DESTROYED THE SOVIET MODEL AND IS DEVELOPING A "CHINESE STYLE SOCIALIST ROAD" BY REFORMING BOTH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON HE DRAWS FROM THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE IS THE NECESSITY TO ELIMINATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRIVILEGES AND TO ESTABLISH A HIGH-LEVEL OF "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY."

10. IN PRIVATE, LIU'S COLLEAGUE IN THE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, LI SHENGZHI, CONCEDES THAT CHINA ITSELF HAS BEEN GRAPPLING SINCE LIBERATION WITH THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRATIZATION AND THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER. WHILE FREELY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT CHINA HAS A LONG WAY TO GO, HE INSISTS THAT THE COUNTRY IS MOVING SLOWLY IF SPORADICALLY TOWARD INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY, SPECIFICALLY BY REVITALIZING LOCAL ELECTIONS, REPRESENTATIVE ORGANS, WORKERS CONGRESSES, AND PRESS CRITICISM OF OFFICIALS, AND BY DECENTRALIZATION OF DECISION MAKING. LI TOLD US RECENTLY THAT CHINA IS STUDYING THE YUGOSLAV AND HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPING A NEW MORE DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT FOR WHICH THERE IS NO PRECEDENT. HE DESCRIBED THE CHINESE APPROACH AS EXPERIMENTAL AND EXTREMELY PRAGMATIC AT THIS POINT, WITH FUTURE ULTIMATE CONFIGURATIONS STILL OBSCURE. HE JOKED THAT THIS APPROACH MAY BE CALLED "DENGISM" WHILE MAKING THE POINT THAT THERE IS NO PRINCIPAL THINKER OR THEORY UNDERLYING THE CHINESE COURSE.

11. LI AND LIU REPRESENT A GROUP OF LIBERAL MARXIST THINKERS IN CHINA WHO, WITH THE APPARENT SUPPORT OF DENG XIAOPING AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN HU YAOGUANG,

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ARE ATTEMPTING TO CONSTRUCT THE THEORETICAL BASE FOR A "CHINESE STYLE SOCIALIST ROAD" -- "SINO-COMMUNISM" -- A CHINESE VERSION OF "COMMUNISM WITH A HUMAN FACE."

12. THE PARTY BUREAUCRATIC MACHINE IN CHINA, HOWEVER, IS PROVING AS RESISTANT TO CHANGE AS ITS SOVIET COUNTERPART. MOST OF THE LIBERALIZING POLITICAL REFORMS TOUTED BY LI HAVE BEEN MODERATED OVER THE PAST YEAR AND CURRENTLY THE REGIME, IN RESPONSE TO A CONSERVATIVE PRESSURES, IS STRESSING "RIGHT THINKING" AND PARTY DISCIPLINE. VICE PREMIER WAN LI RECENTLY TOLD A VISITING AMERICAN GROUP THAT ON THE QUESTION OF REFORM THE TOP AND THE BOTTOM, I.E. THE LEADERSHIP AND THE POPULACE, ARE ON BOARD, BUT THE PROBLEM IS "SIX OR SEVEN THOUSAND" PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE. THESE SEVERAL THOUSAND, HOWEVER, REPRESENT MILLIONS OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS WHO HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN THE STATUS QUO. THE OLD EMPIRE -- CHINA'S OWN PARTY BUREAUCRATIC STATE -- STILL STRIKES BACK WHEN THREATENED. THE LEADERSHIP HAS NOT EVEN BEEN ABLE TO INSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT. LI EMPHASIZED IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH US THAT SOCIETAL CHANGE AND NEW ECONOMIC DIRECTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, WOULD OF NECESSITY BE EXTREMELY GRADUAL GIVEN THE ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED TASK OF SUCH CHANGES IN A COUNTRY AS VAST AS CHINA.

13. THUS, THE QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER OR TO WHAT DEGREE A MARXIST-LENINIST SYSTEM CAN BE REFORMED FROM THE TOP. IRONICALLY, MAO LIKE DENG WAS PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THIS PROBLEM. MAO'S TREATMENT, HOWEVER, PROVED WORSE THAN THE DISEASE, AND DENG HAS ONLY BEGUN TO TEST HIS APPROACH OF INSTITUTING CHECKS AND BALANCES AND DECENTRALIZATION. DENG'S REORDERING OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES TO EMPHASIZE LIGHT INDUSTRY, CONSUMER GOODS, AND LIVING STANDARDS, AS WELL AS RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND THE OPENING OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS TO NON-COMMUNIST (BUT NOT ANTI-COMMUNIST) ELEMENTS, ARE ALL BASED

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UPON A REASONED REJECTION OF THE STALINIST MODEL.

14. LIU KEMING'S CATHING CRITICISM OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE SUGGESTS THAT THE REFORMIST VIEW IS ALIVE AND WELL IN BEIJING. WHILE -- AS MENTIONED ABOVE -- THE ULTIMATE CONFIGURATION OF CHINA'S EVOLVING STRUCTURE IS IN DOUBT EVEN IN THE MINDS OF ITS ADVOCATES IN THE BUREAUCRACY, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE TREND IS AWAY FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC TOTALITARIAN CONTROLS BUILD ON THE SOVIET MODEL. RATHER, CHINA IS MOVING INTO WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED "SINO-COMMUNISM" -- A RELATIVELY MUCH MORE LIBERAL AND FLEXIBLE BRAND OF CHINESE "MARKET SOCIALISM."

HUMMEL

END OF MESSAGE

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